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2010
  May   Japan Eq
  Apr   Japan Eq
  Mar   Japan Eq
  Feb   Japan Eq
  Jan   Japan Eq
 
2009
  Dec I Wished A Client... Japan Eq
  Nov   Japan Eq
  Oct   Japan Eq
  Sept Do Dividends Really Matter? Japan Eq
  August   Japan Eq
  July   Japan Eq
  June   Japan Eq
  May Reflections on Markets in 2009  
  May You Will Come Japan Eq
  Apr Japan Eq
  Mar Japan Eq
  Feb Japan Eq
  Jan Japan Eq
 
2008
  Jan I Forgot More Than You'll Ever Know Japan Eq
  Feb Cash Hoarders & Debt Dependants

Japan Eq

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2007
  Jan   Japan Eq
  Feb What's up in 2007 Japan Eq
  Mar   Japan Eq
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  May Various thoughts on Japan Japan Eq
  Jun Idea Updates Japan Eq
  Jul The Bids Japan Eq
  Aug Japan Eq
  Sep   Japan Eq
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  Nov On the Failure... Japan Eq
  Nov Is Japan a 'Buy'? Japan Eq
  Dec Japan Eq

 

November 2008

LONG ONLY JAPANESE EQUITIES

The strategy’s long association with the Osaka Securities Exchange (‘OSE’) became notably more significant during the summer and autumn of this year. Having maintained a minimal holding of just over 1% for two years, we tripled the size of the holding into sharply falling prices. We accessed the business on an 8% free cash flow yield, 3 times enterprise value to sales, a 2.7% dividend yield and with 37% of market capitalisation backed by cash. This is a business that generates average operating margins of 30% and a return on equity of 14% (lower than it would otherwise be because of the need to retain capital to guard against the risk of counterparty failure). We were presented with such an opportunity because investors anticipate that the company’s revenues and profits will decline as market volumes fall – more likely a 2009 event rather than one this year. We agree, but even at lower levels of volume significant revenues and profits will still be generated as the OSE remains the largest liquidity pool for investing in the Nikkei options and futures, a not inconsiderable quasi-monopoly in our view. For some time the company has been in discussions with the JASDAQ small companies exchange about a combination with its Hercules small companies market. Last month a price was agreed at ¥7bn, using up 25% of its balance sheet cash. The combined exchange could become the largest dedicated small companies market, a franchise that would become strategically valuable if small companies are at the centre of a future bull market as we suspect they will be. There is a chance that, if the market remains weak, the company will trade at a lower price next year but given the strategic importance of its businesses we would not be surprised if it outperformed as it seems to have been doing since we bought it.

For some time we have been keen to access important financial franchises for the strategy. Not only is this a potential area of growth, especially in the area of securitised savings products as bank deposits migrate in search of yield, but also most of the businesses we are keen to buy are leaders in their respective fields. The OSE is one example of such a business. Others include Morningstar Japan, Takefuji, Credit Saison and SFCG. Generating positive returns from such investments in recent market conditions has not surprisingly been challenging and we do not expect any improvement in the immediate future. Nevertheless the current prices of these franchises have never been lower, which reinforces our determination to continue to take advantage of such opportunities.

In light of this we have been monitoring the business and valuation of Nomura, Japan’s largest securities broker, for some time and last month began to start a position in the company for the strategy. Nomura’s best business is its domestic retail distribution, which is unrivalled in the Japanese securities industry. The company’s custody of ¥70t of assets earns them on average an annual transaction fee of approximately 0.5%. Clearly this varies and in good markets, which have not been experienced for some time, fees could be higher. Lately the company has been investing in this business, opening new branches and extending the domestic network further to counter the bigger distribution threat from the banking industry that is now allowed to compete in selling securitised products. The domestic fund management business is also an important franchise. Currently, following market declines, Nomura manages ¥20t in bonds and equities. Average fees, though, are low at approximately 30bp. In the short term, profitability is on the wane following declines in assets under management, which we expect to be addressed through cost cutting. Other businesses include private equity and global investment banking. The purchase of Lehman Brothers’ European operation significantly boosts scale in the investment banking business but at a cost of a big third quarter write-off. Although we rate these two business areas inferior to those of retail distribution and fund management, there is no doubt that there is significant value in Nomura’s domestic corporate investment banking contacts, especially if merger and acquisition activity takes off in Japan as we think it might well do in the future. Like other financials, Nomura is now raising additional capital at unfavourable prices, which has contributed to the weak share price over the last month. Getting a fix on valuation is thus difficult but we think we are buying the shares for approximately 70% of book value adjusted for the expected third quarter losses. Given our approach of buying into weakness, we hope to have the opportunity to add further to the position at even cheaper prices. We would like that.




Michael Lindsell
Nov 2008

09 December 2008 LTL 000-071-3

This document is produced solely for information purposes only. It is not intended for use by private individuals.
Opinions expressed whether in general or both on the performance of individual securities or funds and in a wider economic context represents the view of the fund manager at the time of preparation and may be subject to change without notice. It should not be interpreted as giving investment advice or an investment recommendation. This document is produced solely for information purposes only and may not be copied or distributed without expressed permission.
Past performance is not a guide or guarantee to future performance. Investments are subject to risks and their value and income from them may go up as well as down. Investors may not get back the amount they originally invested.

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2010
  May   Japan Eq
  Apr   Japan Eq
  Mar   Japan Eq
  Feb   Japan Eq
  Jan   Japan Eq
 
2009
  Dec I Wished A Client... Japan Eq
  Nov   Japan Eq
  Oct   Japan Eq
  Sept Do Dividends Really Matter? Japan Eq
  August   Japan Eq
  July   Japan Eq
  June   Japan Eq
  May Reflections on Markets in 2009  
  May You Will Come Japan Eq
  Apr Japan Eq
  Mar Japan Eq
  Feb Japan Eq
  Jan Japan Eq
 
2008
  Jan I Forgot More Than You'll Ever Know Japan Eq
  Feb Cash Hoarders & Debt Dependants

Japan Eq

  Mar Japan Eq
  Apr Japan Eq
  May Japan Eq
  June   Japan Eq
  July   Japan Eq
  Aug   Japan Eq
  Sep   Japan Eq
  Oct   Japan Eq
  Nov   Japan Eq
  Dec   Japan Eq
2007
  Jan   Japan Eq
  Feb What's up in 2007 Japan Eq
  Mar   Japan Eq
  Apr   Japan Eq
  May Various thoughts on Japan Japan Eq
  Jun Idea Updates Japan Eq
  Jul The Bids Japan Eq
  Aug Japan Eq
  Sep   Japan Eq
  Oct   Japan Eq
  Nov On the Failure... Japan Eq
  Nov Is Japan a 'Buy'? Japan Eq
  Dec Japan Eq

 

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